Trade Policy, Trade Costs, and Developing Country Trade by Hoekman , Bernard & Nicita, Alessandro
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4797
Trade Policy, Trade Costs, 























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4797
This paper briefly reviews new indices of trade 
restrictiveness and trade facilitation that have been 
developed at the World Bank. The paper also compares 
the trade impact of different types of trade restrictions 
applied at the border with the effects of domestic policies 
that affect trade costs. Based on a gravity regression 
framework, the analysis suggests that tariffs and non-
tariff measures continue to be a significant source of 
trade restrictiveness for low-income countries despite 
preferential access programs. This is because the value 
of trade preferences is quite limited: a new measure of 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
to assess the impacts of trade costs and border policies on the trade performance of developing countries. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at bhoekman@
worldbank.org and alessandro.nicita@unctad.org.
the relative preference margin developed in the paper 
reveals that this is very low for most country-pairs. Most 
countries with very good (duty-free) access to a market 
generally have competitors that have the same degree 
of access. The empirical analysis suggests that measures 
to improve logistics performance and facilitate trade are 
likely to have the greatest positive effects in expanding 
developing country trade, increasing the trade impacts of 
lowering remaining border barriers by a factor of two or 
more. 
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The trade policy literature has for many years emphasized the importance of taking into 
account the impact of nontariff measures (NTMs) in addition to tariffs – see, e.g., 
Deardorff and Stern (1998). Recent research on trade and development has emphasized 
the magnitude of the trade costs associated with administrative red tape and entry 
barriers, informed by the emergence of new datasets such as the OECD’s Product Market 
regulation database, the World Bank’s “Doing Business” indicators and Logistics 
Performance Index (LPI), as well as firm-level surveys of the prevailing investment 
climate and business environment. 
In this paper we review prevailing trade policies and assess their impacts on 
developing country trade. The objective is to compare the impact of border barriers 
(tariffs, adjusted for bilateral preferences, and NTMs) with other sources of trade costs. 
We limit attention to the impacts of policies as opposed to the cost raising effects of 
differences in infrastructure quality, as our interest is to explore the relative impacts on 
trade volumes of different sources of policy-induced trade costs.   
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 summarizes the current pattern of 
tariff protection and the aggregate of all NTMs captured in the UNCTAD database 
(WITS). Section 2 discusses how we take into account the extensive system of 
preferential trade that has been put in place by OECD countries as well as the numerous 
preferential trade agreements concluded between subsets of WTO members. Section 3 
discusses some of the components of the aggregate NTM measure, as well as regulatory 
policies not included in the NTM database: the “trading across borders” component of the 
World Bank’s Doing Business report, and the Logistics Performance Index. Section 4 
presents the results of an empirical assessment of the relative trade impacts of alternative 
types of policies and the possible trade effects of convergence by developing countries to 
the average levels of border protection and trade facilitation performance levels 
prevailing in middle-income countries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Trade Policies  
Ad valorem tariffs are the most widely used policy instruments to restrict trade, with 
specific duties – taxes that are levied on units (kilograms, liters, alcohol content, etc.) 
  2rather than on import values – often used for agricultural products. Statutory tariffs may 
be complemented by ad-hoc surcharges and surtaxes on a temporary basis, e.g., to cover 
budget deficits or to protect specific domestic industries.  
The use of NTMs has been increasing both in terms of the number of products 
covered and the number of countries utilizing them. NTMs include quantitative 
restrictions, technical product regulations, anti-dumping and countervailing measures and 
discretionary licensing. Although some of these measures, such as product standards, are 
not necessarily protectionist in intent – indeed, often they will not be –they all affect the 
cost of trading and thus affect trade volumes. NTMs are more prevalent in high and 
middle income countries which tend to have lower ad valorem average tariffs (Figure 1).  
In this paper we use two indices of trade restrictiveness: the tariff trade 
restrictiveness index (TTRI) and the overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI) (Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga, 2008a; World Bank and IMF, 2008). Both the TTRI and the OTRI 
are a measure of the uniform tariff equivalent implied by observed trade policies 
affecting a country’s imports – that is, they represent the ad-valorem tariff that would be 
needed to generate the observed level of trade. The difference between the TTRI and 
OTRI is that the OTRI includes the effect of both tariff and NTMs, while the TTRI 
captures only tariffs, both ad valorem and the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs.
1 
These indices are superior to more commonly used indicators such as average tariffs or 
NTM frequency and coverage ratios as they take into account the elasticity of import 
demand with respect to prices. In calculating the indices more weight is given to products 
for which demand is more responsive to changes in prices (so that smaller movements in 
prices produce larger shifts in imports). 
The prevailing average TTRI and OTRI across countries is plotted in Figures 2 
and 3. Trade policies are generally more restrictive in lower-income countries, reflecting 
both lower tariffs in higher-income economies and the fact that their imports are highly 
skewed toward manufactures, which face relatively low barriers. 
                                                 
1 The inclusion of NTMs in the OTRI is done through estimation of ad-valorem tariff equivalents. Both the 
TTR and the OTRI provide a measure of the uniform tariff equivalent of observed policies that is needed to 
generate the observed level of trade for a country.  See Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008a) for details. 
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  4Agricultural trade is much more restricted than manufacturing, both in terms of 
the TTRI and the OTRI, especially in high income countries. This reflects both higher 
tariffs and greater use of NTMs in agricultural trade. A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 
reveals that NTMs contribute substantially to the set of policies restricting global trade, 
especially in agriculture. Differences in the OTRI and TTRI are also evident across 
geographic regions (Table 1). In general, East Asian, Central Asian and East European 
countries are less restrictive, while countries in South Asia and the Middle East and 
North Africa are more restrictive. This pattern is similar for the TTRI and the OTRI, and 
for agriculture and manufacturing.  
 
Table 1: OTRI and TTRI by developing country region 
Region (dev. countries only)  Total Trade  Agriculture  Manufacturing 
  East Asia    11.3% 26.6% 10.4% 
     5.0% 8.7% 4.8% 
  Europe and Central Asia  10.1% 25.9%  9.0% 
     4.5% 10.3% 4.0% 
  Latin America   15.0% 28.1% 13.8% 
     5.4% 6.6% 5.3% 
  Middle East and N Africa.  21.6% 32.3% 19.4% 
     11.9% 12.1% 11.8% 
  South Asia  19.5% 46.4% 18.2% 
     14.0% 31.4% 13.2% 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  14.4% 24.9% 12.9% 
     8.4% 13.8% 7.6% 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
As a result of unilateral reforms and bilateral and regional agreements, global 
trade has been substantially liberalized in recent years. Figure 4 presents scatter plots of 
the TTRI for the years 2000 and 2006. While liberalization has been substantial in most 
countries, tariff reduction has centered more on manufacturing than agricultural products. 
Agricultural trade restrictiveness increased for some countries between 2000 and 2006.
2 
The TTRI has declined both for all country groups. Middle-income economies have seen 
the largest decline, including in agriculture. By region, countries in East Asia and Latin 
America (Sub-Saharan Africa) have reduced tariffs the most (least). 
                                                 
2 As NTM data has not been updated recently, the change in the OTRI is not reported.  
  5 

























































































2. Market Access and the Effect of Trade Preferences 
The effect of trade policies on exporters’ access to markets differs across trading partners 
and geographic regions. The average restrictiveness that exporters face in a particular 
market depends not just on tariffs and NTMs but on the composition of exports and the 
extent and incidence of preferential access regimes. Table 2 reports levels of 
restrictiveness from a market access perspective, using the market access versions of the 
TTRI and the OTRI. These measure the restrictiveness of policies confronting exporters 
from in each geographic region and country group. Upper middle income countries 
generally enjoy better market access in both developing and developed countries. This is 
largely due to the composition of exports from these countries, which are skewed toward 
manufacturing. Low income countries face more restrictive market access conditions 
because their exports are more biased toward agriculture.  
 
  6Table 2 – Market Access TTRI and OTRI 
     Exporting  Countries 
Importing 
























                     
High Income      6.3 5.7 7.9 9.1    8.3 5.1  7.0 4.3  10.4 4.4 
     2.4 1.2 2.5 2.4    2.6 1.1 1.5  0.8  3.1  0.7 
    QUAD     6.3 5.2 8.6  10.6    8.9 5.2  6.9 4.4  13.6 4.5 
     2.1 0.9 2.5 2.5    2.7 0.8 1.2  0.5  3.3  0.5 
Upper Middle     15.6 11.8 15.8 14.7    19.2 10.2  13.6  6.0 14.3  5.9 
     5.6 3.8 5.6 5.7    7.2 4.4 2.6  2.5  6.6  3.5 
Lower Middle     12.4 11.1 12.9  9.4    13.6 11.2  12.6  6.7  9.9  4.0 
     7.1 4.8 6.7 5.1    6.6 6.2 5.1  2.8  6.2  2.7 
Low Income      18.2 14.3 19.5 25.4    22.2 17.7  15.9 16.3  16.2 16.3 
     10.9 8.1 12.2  12.9    13.8 6.2 9.0  10.0  10.4  12.2 
Source: Own calculations. MA-OTRI in bold; MA-TTRI in italics. 
 
 
Across developing country regions, South Asia faces the most restrictive market 
access, due to export composition (agriculture, textiles and apparel) and because it has 
relatively limited preferential access. Sub-Saharan countries have the best market access, 
especially in high income countries, reflecting again export composition (minerals, 
primary products, plantation agriculture), as well as low or zero tariffs in many high 
income countries. By far the highest levels of market access barriers apply to South-
South trade flows. Sub-Saharan African countries confront TTRIs and OTRIs in low-
income countries that are 3 to 4 times higher than those that apply in middle- and high-
income markets.  
Comparing the MA-TTRI and the MA-OTRI suggests that NTMs are generally 
more important in restricting trade than tariffs: their measured ad-valorem equivalent is 
much higher than existing tariffs. Standards, licensing and similar regulatory instruments 
typically affect all products entering a market regardless of their origin, so that the impact 
of NTMs is relatively similar across trading partners. Tariffs, conversely, are generally 
negotiated on a bilateral basis, thus giving some trading partners a substantial advantage 
  7in market access. With the increase in reciprocal and nonreciprocal preferential 
agreements, almost all trade flows today are affected by some sort of tariff preference. 
This is particularly true for high-income countries, where market access is affected by 
increasing number of such agreements.  
The proliferation of preferential trade arrangements makes it important to 
properly measure the preferential margins confronting countries in assessing the relative 
market access conditions confronting exporters. This is done in the TTRI and OTRI in a 
direct way, as the calculations take into account the bilateral market access conditions 
that apply. But what matters for a given country, however, is the relative preference (the 
relative market access conditions), not just the absolute level of prevailing barriers at the 
border. 
  Commonly used measures of preference margins compare the preferential tariff to 
the MFN rate. This will overestimate the relative preference enjoyed by countries as in 
most instances other countries will also have preferential access. In practice it is possible 
that preferential rates granted to a particular country, although lower than MFN, still 
penalize it relative to other countries that benefit from an even lower or zero tariffs. To 
calculate the relative preferential margin the focus needs to be on the average advantage – 
in tariff percentage points – that a given basket of goods enjoys when exported from 
country A as compared to when it originates in other countries. 
  To clarify with an example, in what follows we calculate the relative preferential 
margin that Mexico enjoys in the US by using as the counterfactual the average tariff for 
Mexico’s export bundle if this were to originate in other countries. The relative 
preferential margin is the difference between the bilateral trade-weighted preferential 
tariff imposed by the US on Mexico and that counterfactual. There are two set of weights 
when calculating this margin: first, the counterfactual, which is a weighted average of 
tariffs imposed on all other (potential) exporters to the US; and second, the preferential 
margin, which is an average constructed across many tariff lines.  
   To measure the counterfactual, we first calculate the trade-weighted average tariff 
at the tariff line level that an importer (the US) imposes on all other countries except the 
country for which the preferential margin is calculated (Mexico). This is done by using 
(US) bilateral imports as weights, so as to take into account the supply capacity of (US) 
  8trading partners. We then aggregate across tariff lines using (Mexican) exports (to the 
US) to take care of differences in product composition across partners.
3  
   A simpler alternative measure would be to compare the (US) import weighted 
average tariff imposed on a country (Mexico) with that imposed on all other countries.
4 
This approach uses total imports (by the US) at the HS 6 digit level as weights. A 
problem with this method is that it disregards product composition: if Mexico’s export 
bundle to the US is not representative of the composition of US imports (e.g., Mexican 
exports to the US are mainly agricultural, while US imports mainly manufacturing), using 
exclusively US imports as weights in the calculation of the counterfactual would likely 
lead to biased results.
5  
A further complication arises in the aggregation across tariff lines. A proper 
aggregation would take into account that imports of some goods are more responsive to 
changes in prices than others. In theory, imports that are less sensitive to prices (inelastic) 
should be given less weight as tariffs change – as they would have little effect on overall 
volumes of trade.
6 To correct for this, HS six digit product lines are aggregated using the 
import demand elasticities.
7  
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where, imp are imports, ε is the import demand elasticity, t is the tariff, k indexes  
importers, hs are HS 6 digit categories, and v are exporters competing with country j in 
exporting to country k. This equation is simply the MA-TTRI of country j minus the 
 
3 As trade flows are generally reported at the six digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), this indicator 
is constructed at the HS 6 digit level instead of the tariff line level.   
4 This is the approach taken by Low, Piermartini and Richtering (2008). 
5 This simpler methodology would be consistent with a framework where export composition is a function 
of the structure of the tariff of the importing country (everything else equal, exports would concentrate in 
product lines with lower tariffs), however, as the intent is to assess the preferential margin applied on the 
existing structure of trade, the measure controlling for product composition is to be preferred. Also, export 
composition is more likely to be determined by other factors affecting comparative advantage, such as level 
of development, land quality, climate, geography and labor force skills. 
6 Complicating the framework even more, one should take into account substitution possibilities across 
similar products originating in different countries.  For simplicity, we abstract from this and assume that 
substitution elasticities are equal to one.  
7 See Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008b) for the methodology used to estimate import demand elasticities. 
  9counterfactual given by an equivalent MA-TTRI but calculated on the basis of tariffs 
applied to competitors of country j. This index can be calculated bilaterally (Mexico’s 
relative preferences in the US market) or at the country level (Mexico’s overall level of 
relative preferences for its exports relative to all its export markets). In the latter case all 
bilateral trade flows of a particular country are considered.  
This measure of preference margin can be positive or negative, depending on the 
advantage or disadvantage of the country with respect to other exporters. Table 3 reports 
relative preferential margins averaged by region. All regions have positive relative 
preferential margins with themselves. This indicates the importance of regional trade 
agreements. The most “effective” regional agreements in terms of preferences are in 
Latin America, where countries enjoy a relative preferential margin of about 3 percent. 
Latin America both enjoys and provides a substantial preferential margin to the USA and 
Canada, reflecting trade agreements with the US and within the region (MERCOSUR, 
etc.). This is mirrored by the negative preference that countries outside Latin America 
face when they export to that region. 
 



















East Asia 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
East Europe Central Asia 0.0 0.5 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
Latin America -2.5 -1.9 3.0 -0.5 -2.1 -1.2 1.7
Middle East and North Africa -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.9 -0.2 0.1 0.0
Sout Asia -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 2.0 -0.1 -0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
High Income Countries -0.5 0.4 0.7 0.2 -0.5 0.1 0.1
   Australia and New Zealand -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1
   Canada -1.0 -0.8 1.7 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.0
   European Union 0.1 1.1 1.0 0.6 -0.7 0.5 -0.5
   Japan 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 -0.1
   USA -0.7 0.0 1.0 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0  
 
Relative preference margins, whether positive or negative, are much smaller for 
other regions. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, enjoy a relative preferential 
margin of only about 0.5 percent in the EU, as they compete both among themselves and 
other countries to which the EU provides preferences (Eastern Europe, North Africa and 
Latin America). Relative preferential margins are mostly negative for East Asian states.  
  10Country-specific estimates of the relative preference margin for a number of Sub-
Saharan countries are reported in Table 4. Bilateral preferences are significant in only a 
few cases, and in a few instances they actually negative, putting the countries concerned 
in a situation similar to that applying to East Asian economies. Only Madagascar has 
significant preferential margins – greater than 2 percentage points – in more than two 
markets. Most countries have meaningful preferential margins in only one or two 
markets, and many do not have margins that meet the 2 percentage point threshold. 
Taking into account that the empirical literature on the ‘tariff equivalent’ of rules of 
origin finds that these average some 3 to 4 percent, these calculations suggest that the 
value of preferential programs is quite limited. 
 
Table 4: Relative Preference Margins for African countries, 2006 (percentage point) 






ANGOLA 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
BENIN 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
BURKINA FASO 4.2 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.3
CENT.AFR.REP 1.9 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
COTE DIVOIRE 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
CAMEROON 0.0 -0.2 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.3
CONGO 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
ETHIOPIA 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.8
GHANA -0.1 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.6
KENYA 0.0 -0.5 1.2 0.1 -0.9 0.7
MADAGASCAR 1.4 7.5 3.9 0.8 -1.0 2.9
MALI 1.9 1.6 0.4 2.8 0.2 0.3
MOZAMBIQUE 0.5 0.2 4.5 0.5 -0.2 2.8
MAURITANIA 0.4 4.4 0.4 6.9 0.0 0.2
MALAWI 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 -3.0 0.0
NIGER 2.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 2.0 0.0
NIGERIA -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
RWANDA 4.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
SUDAN 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
SENEGAL 1.4 0.6 2.3 3.0 0.2 1.0
CHAD 4.6 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
TOGO 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.1
TANZANIA 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.3 2.3
UGANDA 0.0 0.2 1.5 0.2 0.0 1.2
ZAMBIA 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.6 -0.3




  113. Complementing NTMs with Other Trade Costs 
The foregoing discussion of the trade restrictiveness of policies illustrates that NTMs are 
the major source of barriers to trade but that tariffs also remain important, especially in 
developing countries. A question to which we return below is what is more important, 
NTMs or tariffs for a given developing country or region. Given low relative preferences, 
remaining MFN tariffs could have bigger effects than some of the NTMs, especially for 
South-South trade flows. But the average magnitude of NTMs in higher-income countries 
clearly suggests that action to reduce their trade-impeding effects could have high 
payoffs. 
The NTMs included in the indicators discussed above are only a subset of the 
policies that result in impediments to trade. Internal trade and transactions costs may be 
of equal if not greater importance in reducing volumes of trade. Many of these trade costs 
reflect the domestic economic environment: the legal and regulatory framework, the 
efficiency of infrastructure services and related regulation, customs clearance procedures, 
administrative red tape, etc. For OECD countries there is a substantial amount of 
information on the extent of product market regulation (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
2003), but such comparable data do not exist for developing country regulatory regimes. 
However, there data available for a large number of developing countries on the 
performance of logistics services and on the internal costs associated with shipping goods 
from the factory gate to the port, and from ports to retail outlets. The first is captured by 
the Logistics Performance Index (World Bank 2007) and complementary indicators of 
trade facilitation (Helble, Shepherd, and Wilson 2007); the second is covered by the 
Doing Business database (World Bank, 2008).  All of these indicators capture dimensions 
of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes that affect trade.  
The Doing Business “cost of trading” measures the fees associated with 
completing the procedures to export or import a 20-foot container, measured in U.S. 
dollars (Djankov, Freund and Cong, 2006). These include costs for documents, 
administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling 
charges and inland transport. The cost measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. 
Only official costs are recorded. The indicator is part of the Doing Business trading 
across borders index, which compiles the number of documents, the cost and the time 
  12necessary for procedural requirements for exporting and importing a standardized cargo 
of goods by ocean transport. Local freight forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers 
and port officials provide information on required documents and cost as well as the time 
to complete each procedure. Inland transport costs are based on distance to the shipping 
port. The methodology, surveys and data are available at http://www.doingbusiness.org. 
The Logistics Performance Index (LPI) provides a snapshot of the supply 
chain performance of countries. Based on a worldwide survey of global freight 
forwarders and express carriers, the LPI measures the logistics friendliness of the 
countries surveyed. Feedback from the survey is supplemented with data on the 
performance of key components of the logistics chain. In this paper only two 
components of the LPI are used: indicators of the efficiency of customs and a 
measure of access to (choice of) and affordability of international shipment. A 
higher LPI score implies a better quality logistics environment. The underlying 
methodology of the LPI and data are available at http://www.worldbank.org/lpi. 
The Trade Facilitation Index (TFI) is based on secondary sources: McArthur and 
Sachs (2002); IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000; and Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002). The TFI focuses on the following four areas of performance: 
port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment, service-sector 
infrastructure. Port efficiency is designed to measure the quality of port infrastructure, 
both maritime and airports. The customs environment measures direct customs clearance 
costs as well as the administrative transparency of customs processes. The regulatory 
environment measures an economy’s approach to regulation. The service-sector 
infrastructure variable measures the extent to which an economy has the necessary 
domestic infrastructure for e-business transactions and employs information networks to 
improve efficiency. For the purpose of this paper only the customs and regulatory 
environment parts of this index are considered, with a higher score indicating 
better performance. For a more detailed description of the Trade Facilitation Index see 
Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2003). 
Table 5 reports the average of these indices by income country groups. 
Developing countries generally have weaker trade facilitation performance than higher-
income economies. 
  13 





income   Low income 
LPI  (score)  3.9 3.0 2.8 
DB import (US$)  813.6  1024.2  1212.0 
DB export (US$)  774.4  867.2  949.3 
Trade Facilitation (score)  6.1 4.2 3.7 
 
 
4. An Empirical Assessment 
In this section we use a gravity model framework to assess the impacts of border barriers 
and differences in trade costs and regulatory policies on merchandise trade flows. In a 
nutshell, the gravity model predicts bilateral trade flows based on the economic sizes of 
and distance between two countries. Country specific trade costs are captured by country 
fixed effects or multilateral resistance terms. The literature has recently focused more on 
quantifying domestic costs of trading. These additional trade costs have been generally 
measured by the inclusion of specific variables (generally a measure of infrastructures 
such as roads, railways, phone lines, etc).  
  Recent studies find that domestic institutions and infrastructure determine 
volumes of trade across countries (Limão and Venables, 2001; Wilson, Mann, and 
Otsuki, 2003; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Francois and Manchin, 2007). In general, 
the literature supports the hypothesis that domestic trade costs and the economic 
environment are significant determinants of the volume of trade between countries. What 
follows builds on the existing literature using gravity models to investigate the 
importance of trade and related regulatory policies on trade flows. In addition to the 
TTRI and the NTM component of the OTRI (defined as the difference between the OTRI 
and the TTRI), we use the three indicators discussed above.   
To capture the effect of traditional trade policies we use the TTRI and the 
difference between the OTRI and the TTRI (which captures the effect of NTMs). As this 
is calculated at the bilateral level, this will also soak up any variance due to the presence 
  14of preferential trade agreements.
8 We use a traditional cross-section gravity model that 
includes time invariant trade impediments (distance, adjacency, common language, 
access to the sea) as well as trade policy and regulatory/trade cost variables. The 
multilateral resistance term (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) is proxied by 
“remoteness” variables following Baier and Bergstrand (2007). This methodology 
produces consistent estimates and, contrary to using country fixed effects, allows the 
estimation of the effect of domestic factors such as logistics and red tape. The gravity 
equation is estimated using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML). This produces 
consistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity and is more robust to truncation 
(Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).  
The dataset covers 104 importers and 115 exporters. All data are for 2006. In a 
few cases where 2006 data were not available, 2005 or 2004 data has been used. Trade 
data are from WITS (COMTRADE), GDP data from the World Development Indicators, 
gravity type variables are obtained from the Trade Production and Protection database 
(Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007), and trade policy data from the OTRI database (Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga 2008a,b). Finally, data on the LPI and domestic trade costs were obtained 
from the LPI and the Doing Business websites.  
  Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for a series of specifications with and 
without the domestic trade costs terms. Trade flows occur across about 90 percent of 
countries in the sample; estimation results are provided only for the regressions run 
without zero trade observations. The PPML results are robust to truncation – results 
including zero trade bilateral flows are quite similar to those reported in the table. 
Compared to standard OLS, the results of the PPML estimator are similar in sign, but the 
magnitude of coefficient estimates varies.  
The results are typical of those of other gravity equation models. Distance is an 
important determinant of bilateral trade, as are a common border and common language. 
Landlocked countries tend to trade less, especially in terms of exports, although estimated 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Larger and more populous countries tend to 
trade more. Trade policies (tariffs and NTMs) are statistically significant determinants of 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, the effect of trade policy could be captured by the TTRI computed on a MFN basis plus an 
additional term capturing the relative preferential margin. 
  15trade volumes. On average, a reduction in the TTRI of 10 percent would increase trade 
volumes a little more than 2 percent, while NTMs add another 1.8 percent.
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Table 6. Gravity Equation Results (Poisson Pseudo ML Estimator)  
(Dependent Variable = Value of Imports) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.865 *** -0.826 *** -0.794 *** -0.803 *** -0.768 *** -0.836 *** -0.784 *** -0.820 ***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
0.759 *** 0.821 *** 0.595 *** 0.782 *** 0.746 *** 0.853 *** 0.799 *** 0.621 ***
(0.029) (0.040) (0.049) (0.036) (0.065) (0.046) (0.062) (0.061)
0.771 *** 0.737 *** 0.592 *** 0.714 *** 0.586 *** 0.736 *** 0.599 *** 0.518 ***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.043) (0.029) (0.055) (0.029) (0.055) (0.085)
0.072 ** 0.068 ** 0.220 *** 0.061 * 0.091 * 0.037 0.037 0.250 ***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.033) (0.047) (0.043) (0.047) (0.059)
0.064 ** 0.142 ** 0.202 *** 0.126 *** 0.237 *** 0.127 * 0.210 ** 0.325 ***
(0.030) (0.058) (0.042) (0.042) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.103)
1.069 *** 1.210 *** 0.969 *** 1.003 *** 0.969 *** 1.218 *** 0.946 *** 1.055 ***
(0.136) (0.162) (0.114) (0.139) (0.131) (0.177) (0.151) (0.147)
1.404 *** 1.397 *** 1.211 *** 1.173 *** 1.117 *** 1.358 *** 1.090 *** 1.221 ***
(0.132) (0.130) (0.124) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127) (0.126) (0.136)
-0.098 -0.028 -0.096 0.023 0.009 -0.010 0.027 0.070
(0.104) (0.130) (0.100) (0.127) (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.145)
-0.148 ** -0.100 -0.173 ** -0.045 -0.071 -0.114 -0.072 -0.064
(0.079) (0.095) (0.077) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.096) (0.115)
0.301 *** 0.470 *** 0.439 *** 0.566 *** 0.632 *** 0.539 *** 0.664 *** 0.557 ***
(0.115) (0.150) (0.109) (0.150) (0.153) (0.154) (0.148) (0.153)
0.244 *** -0.041 0.186 * -0.105 -0.121 0.057 -0.048 -0.203
(0.106) (0.140) (0.102) (0.144) (0.141) (0.131) (0.135) (0.158)
-0.227 *** -0.240 *** -0.219 *** -0.216 *** -0.231 *** -0.238 ** -0.134 -0.204 ***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.110) (0.088) (0.044)
-0.181 *** -0.108 ** -0.148 *** -0.147 *** -0.101 * -0.102 * -0.229 ***
(0.054) (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.061) (0.054) (0.057)
0.537 *** 0.100 0.097
(0.107) (0.143) (0.131)
0.513 *** 0.421 *** 0.377 **
(0.107) (0.133) (0.131)
-0.481 *** -0.436 *** -0.449 ***
(0.093) (0.101) (0.107)






3.548 *** 3.403 ***
(0.695) (0.677)
Pseudo R-squared 0.858 0.859 0.863 0.873 0.871 0.871 0.882 0.862






























                                                 
9 The effect of NTMs is captured at the margin, i.e., given the effect of the existing tariff structure. 
  16Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. To capture the effect of preferences, in the last two columns the TTRI is computed as the 
MFN tariff-based TTRI rather than the preferential tariff-based TTRI. 
 
 
Other trade costs are important. Coefficient estimates for the LPI suggest that a 
one point reduction in the LPI score would increase trade volumes by about 50 percent, 
both in terms of exports and imports. Similar results are found for internal trade costs as 
captured by the Doing Business indicators. The elasticity of imports to the cost of 
importing is about 0.48, and that of exports to the cost of exporting is about 0.47. That is, 
a 10 percent reduction in the cost associated with importing (exporting) would increase 
imports (exports) by about 4.8 percent (4.7 percent). When including both the LPI and 
the Doing Business indicators in the estimation, all coefficients remain significant except 
for the LPI for the importers. This suggests that the indices do not completely overlap – 
each captures different factors affecting the cost of trading.  
  The effect of tariff preferences on the volume of trade is taken into account by 
adding the relative preferential margin discussed above. The regression suggests 
preferences have a statistically significant positive impact on bilateral trade flows. 
Results suggest that preferences are important: a 1 percentage point advantage over 
competitors provides an increase in exports of about 3.5 percent. However, as observed 
above, relative preferences are generally well below 1 percentage point. This preference 
impact result continues to hold if the LPI and DB variables are also included. Note that 
inclusion of the relative preference margin results in coefficient estimates for the TTRI 
and OTRI that are either less significant or no longer significant, although the signs of 
both continue to be negative. Thus, preferences do appear to have the intended effect of 
offsetting the effects of MFN tariffs, although, as expected, they do less to help exporters 
deal with NTMs and do nothing to reduce the impacts of domestic trade transactions 
costs. 
A final specification is estimated using the trade facilitation index. This index 
captures issues related to the quality of the transport infrastructure, customs, and contract 
enforcement. Data for this index are collected for a smaller number of countries, thus 
reducing the number of observations substantially. Although the difference in sample size 
  17implies the results cannot be properly compared, the picture that emerges is similar to 
that obtained from using the LPI and the Doing Business indicators: the quality of the 
prevailing regulatory environment matters for trade performance.
10   
  To assess the relative impacts of internal trade costs and the trade-impeding effect 
of border trade policies, Table 7 reports the predicted effect on trade if low-income 
countries were to converge to a set of policies that would generate the observed average 
levels of the various indicators in middle-income countries (as reported in Table 5). 
These results are compared with the average effect of an increase of 1 percentage point in 
relative preferential access to global markets (not just the OECD) and with a reduction in 
the TTRI and OTRI to 5 and 10 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 7: Effects of convergence by low income countries to middle income average 
 Indicator/policy area  Increase in Imports  Increase in Exports 
LPI Score  15.2%   14.6%  
Doing Business, cost of trading  7.4%   4.1%  
Trade Facilitation Index  14.0%   12.6%  
       
TTRI for low income countries reduced to 5%  5.7%      
OTRI for low income countries reduced to 10%  8.4%      
Relative Preference Margin increased by 1 
percentage point  n.a.  3.5%  
 
The predicted increases in trade volumes of low-income countries of this 
convergence experiment are substantial. The largest increases in trade are associated with 
actions to improve the logistics/trade facilitation scores (as measured by the LPI and the 
trade facilitation index). Improving performance on the Doing Business measure of 
internal trade costs has an impact that is similar to what could be obtained by further 
traditional trade policy reform – reducing the TTRI or bringing down the restrictiveness 
of NTMs.  
  In general terms, these results indicate that administrative and regulatory policies 
are at least as important as trade policies in impeding trade. This supports the recent focus 
of many developing countries on taking action to facilitate trade. A key question for 
                                                 
10 This indicator is collinear with the Doing Business cost of trading and the LPI index: inclusion of all 
three variables results in the coefficient estimates losing their statistical significance. 
  18policymakers is of course how performance can be increased on the measures used 
above. This requires country-specific analysis.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The focus of policy debates and international cooperation is more and more on regulatory 
policies. In this paper we have investigated the impact of a subset of such policies that 
directly affect trade costs, including traditional trade policies. The latter continue to be 
important in developing countries as well as for some sectors in high-income countries 
(agriculture in particular). This raises the question of which set of policies is more 
important as a trade impediment. The analysis in this paper suggests that the impact of 
reducing the costs associated with policies that increase transactions costs at and behind 
the border will have a greater payoff than further reductions in tariffs and NTMs, or 
seeking additional trade preferences. Our results also indicate that focusing attention on 
the policies that underpin the logistics and trade facilitation indices will have a bigger 
impact than actions to reduce the costs of the procedures that are captured by the Doing 
Business “cost of trading” variable. While suggestive, further work is needed to “unpack” 
these findings. 
The analysis also makes clear that there are still large gains from trade to be had 
from traditional trade liberalization – which is the focus of the ongoing Doha Round of 
WTO negotiations. Progress in the Round has unfortunately been slow. Bringing the 
Doha Round to a successful conclusion is important as it would imply improvements in 
market access to all export markets. Trade facilitation does not require multilateral (or 
bilateral) negotiations – the costs that are incurred by traders in developing countries can 
and should be reduced through unilateral actions. The analysis in this paper strongly 
supports the argument made by Ikenson (2008) that there is great scope to enhance 
growth opportunities “while Doha sleeps.”  
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